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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

EDGAR JOSE MONTERO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20060859-CA

The Defendant/Appellant Edgar Montero maintains that Detective Adamson
coerced a confession from him. (See Br. of Appellant, March 8, 2007). The totality of
the circumstances reflects that Adamson interrogated Montero over a six-plus-hour
period using misrepresentations, persistence, periods of incommunicado, threats and
promises, absence of family, and the false-friend technique. In the end, Montero confessed to stop the interrogation. (See R. 488:297-99). The coerced confession was
unlawful. See State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, | 1 1 , 984 P.2d 1009 (recognizing that
"certain interrogation techniques'1 may be "so offensive to a civilized system of justice
that they must be condemned"). It should have been suppressed. The trial court erred
when it allowed the confession to be used in evidence.
The state disagrees. (Br. of Appellee, May 7, 2007). In its analysis, the state
isolates various events during the interrogation and suggests that the individual events fail
to support that Montero's will was overborne. That analysis disregards the law, where the
interrogation must be assessed under the totality of the circumstances. Here, Adamson

engaged in several manipulative tactics that were designed to induce Montero to confess
when he otherwise would not have done so.
Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this reply brief
addresses the state's divide-and-conquer analysis for the coerced confession. For the
reasons stated herein, and as more fully set forth in the Brief of Appellant, Montero
maintains the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
THE CONFESSION WAS COERCED AND SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.
A. THE STATE ISOLATES INDIVIDUAL EVENTS IN THE
INTERROGATION TO CLAIM THAT THE CONFESSION WAS NOT
COERCED. YET THE ANALYSIS MUST CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
The State's Divide-and-Conquer Approach. Montero maintains his confession
was coerced. (Br. of Appellant, Argument A.) His argument considers the interrogation
as a whole, and the numerous techniques used by the detective throughout the interrogation to extract a confession. (Id.) In response, the state relies on a divide-and-conquer
analysis. It evaluates individual events in isolation to determine whether each separate
event established coercion. (See Br. of Appellee, 26-45; see specifically id. at 29
(claiming statements challenged as "unduly threatening" and made "approximately five
hours" before the confession "cannot reasonably be said to have compelled defendant's
confession"); 29-30 (claiming that a statement challenged as improperly threatening and
occurring "in the second segment of the interview" following a break "is not coercive");
30 (claiming "[t]he same is true" of the "allegedly improper threat" in the "final segment
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of the interview"); 32-33 (stating that while the detective deferred defendant's request to
call his mother, that does not indicate that "defendant's will was overborne"); 34
(claiming the length of the interrogation "is a Tar cry from'" a violation); 37-38 (stating
that when an officer recasts the facts as less serious to induce a confession, that technique
'"standing alone'" does not "overcome a suspect's will") (cite omitted); 39-42 (stating
police misrepresentations are '"insufficient... to make [an] otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible"'; police may use "small deceptions"; and "a 'defendant's will is not
overborne simply because he is led to believe that the government's knowledge of his
guilt is greater than it actually is'") (cites omitted; brackets in original; emphasis added);
44-45 (claiming no "arguable misrepresentation" here "sufficed to overbear [defendant's]
will"); 46 (claiming the "false-friend technique" is "not inherently coercive")).
The state's method of considering each event in isolation or "standing alone"
(quoting Br. of Appellee, 38) - and then disavowing it as coercion - undermines the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, lfl[19, 20-45
(considering the totality of the circumstances).
Indeed, while it is true that an isolated technique may support coercion, see, e.g.,
id, at fIf 11, 20 (stating certain techniques in isolation or as applied to the characteristics
of the accused are offensive and must be condemned), the same may not be said for the
voluntariness showing. That is, for voluntariness, a court "must examine the 'totality of
the circumstances'" or the whole picture to determine whether a confession was made
"freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." Id at ^14 (cite
omitted).
3

And while a "defendant's will" may not be overborne "simply because" (quoting
Br. of Appellee, 42 (emphasis added)) of an isolated incident - where, for example, an
officer tells a half-truth - the facts and circumstances as a whole may compel a different
result. The synergy of the collective tactics may elevate the interrogation to the level of a
coerced confession. See, e.g., Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ^}45 (fully considering several
events, including misrepresentations, false-friend technique, threats and promises, and
other factors to find coercion). Here Montero has not claimed that his will was overborne
simply because of an isolated event. (See Br. of Appellant, Argument A.) He has relied
on the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant (Argument A.), the overall circumstances
demonstrate that Detective Adamson used threats and promises throughout the
interrogation interspersed with other techniques including relentless pressure and
cajoling, the false-friend technique, and attempts to induce a confession to the shooting
with justification or mitigating circumstances. (Br. of Appellant, 15-34 (reflecting total
circumstances of the interrogation); id. at 35-46 (pointing to techniques used throughout
the interrogation)). In addition, the circumstances support that Adamson used
misrepresentations, deceptions, and misleading information throughout. (See id. at 3546). The circumstances support coercion. The state's divide-and-conquer or piecemeal
approach should be prohibited.
The State9s Claims Regarding Specific Techniques. Next, with respect to
Adamson's techniques, the state acknowledges that Detective Adamson "may have
overstated" some of the evidence against Montero (quoting Br. of Appellee, 43). Indeed,
4

the state does not dispute the falseness of Adamson's repeated claims to Montero that
"friends" identified him as the shooter. (See Br. of Appellee, 40 (reiterating Montero's
argument that Adamson made misrepresentations about "friends" implicating him; and
reiterating that Lonia Kersey did not place Montero in the red SUV, Jose Johnson refused
to cooperate, Marci Batchelor had not been interviewed at the time of Montero!s interrogation, and Eugene Spight had not specifically identified Montero)). However, the state
seems to brush off the falsehoods as insignificant to the analysis. (See, e.g., id. at 40-41).
Yet when officers allow a suspect to believe that friends have implicated him in
crime, such duplicity may lead the suspect "to see [himself] as either being set up or
railroaded." Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f 22 (citing Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo,
The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U.L.
Rev. 979, 1044 (1997)). "Such a suspect may well determine that 'continued resistance
is futile (because the police have evidence that will convict him despite his innocence).'"
Id. (citing Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 Rutgers L.Rev.
2001, 2053 (1998)). "Such a suspect may also conclude that, given the futility of
resistance, it is most prudent to cooperate and even confess falsely in order to get
leniency." Id. Duplicity is relevant to the analysis.
The state further discounts additional misrepresentations made by Adamson in the
interrogation. According to the state, the "trial transcript shows that police talked to
many witnesses at the scene of the shooting [who] had tied defendant to the murder."
(Br. of Appellee, 40 (citing "R487:144, 158, 180-81; R488:244"); but see R. 487:144
(reflecting that officers had a general description of a white male, "5 feet to 6 feet tall,"
5

wearing jeans, a white T-shirt and a black jacket); 487:158 (reflecting that witnesses were
not at the party); 487:180-81 (reflecting descriptions and specifying Jose Johnson); 488:
244 (putting Sword and Jose Johnson at the scene)). Yet witnesses, who were questioned
before Adamson's interrogation with Montero, did not identify Montero as the shooter
even when they were shown a picture of him in a photo lineup. (See R. 487:152-55,162;
488:311). Thus, Adamson's interrogation statements suggesting otherwise were false.
Also, although Eugene Spight identified Montero as the shooter at trial, he did not
identify Montero to police shortly after the shooting and before Adamson interrogated
Montero. (R. 488:304-07 (reflecting that Eugene talked to officers when he was drunk,
upset, crying and spent - or "shot" - and he identified two suspects); 488:308, 311 (indicating that Eugene identified a white boy named Pierre Brandon)). In fact, since Eugene
had not specifically identified Montero, Adamson told Montero to "hang out for a couple
of hours" during the interrogation so that he could show pictures to Eugene. (R. 135). In
addition, contrary to the state's assertion, the evidence suggests that when Eugene Spight
talked to police after the shooting, he believed the shooter was a front-seat passenger in a
Jeep. (R. 488:307, 308, 311 (indicating that Eugene told officers the suspect got into the
front passenger seat of a Jeep)).
The state likewise downplays Adamson's assertions during the interrogation concerning gun shot residue (GSR) testing, fingerprints, and DNA evidence. (See Br. of
Appellee, 44 (citing "R122, 183-84")). According to the state, Adamson did not claim to
already have results from those tests implicating Montero; "but rather," he asserted that
investigators "merely planned to conduct those tests additional tests [sic]." (Id.)
6

Yet during the interrogation, Adamson used the threat of the tests to expose
Montero as the shooter if he did not confess. Adamson claimed officers would collect or
already had collected compelling physical evidence that Montero would not be able to
explain away. (R. 121-23 (stating that officers had performed the GSR test on Montero,
and demanding that Montero explain what they would find from the test); 183 (indicating
during the interrogation that DNA evidence in the coat would reveal the shooter); 184
(stating during the interrogation that if Montero were innocent, "we won't find
fingerprints" on the gun; also "if [they're] on [there] ... then that's a bad deal right")).
According to case law, officers generally make such misleading statements to an
accused during an interrogation to make him believe the physical evidence will convict
him, so he may as well confess. See, e.g., Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f23. According to
the Utah Supreme Court, a suspect may be "more likely to confess when faced with
assertions, as here, that the State has evidence of fingerprints, palm prints, ballistic
evidence and the like, implicating him because '[b]oth the guilty and the innocent have a
harder time explaining away evidence that is allegedly derived from scientific
technologies.'" Id (citing Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, at 1023).
The record here supports that Adamson wanted a confession. Also, Jose Johnson
(aka "Savvy D" or "Savage") was a primary focus (seeR. 487:166, 179-81; 488:244-45),
but refused to cooperate (R. 487:156, 193; 488:245-48). Consequently, Adamson worked
Montero. Adamson's misrepresentations and threats, along with other coercive tactics,
had an effect on Montero. (See Br. of Appellant, 15-46 (pointing to techniques used
throughout the interrogation)). Montero confessed to end the interrogation. (See, e.g., R.
7

488:297-99). In this case, each technique added to the total coercive circumstances.
Finally, with respect to the fact that Montero was handcuffed to a chair in the
interrogation room for more than six hours, the state maintains that does not contribute to
coercion. (See Br. of Appellee, 36). In connection with that claim, the state cites to U.S.
v. Cardenas, 410 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2005); State v. Whitaker, 135 P.3d 923 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2006); and State v. Agnello, 674 N.W.2d 594, 600 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). Those
cases are distinguishable.
In Cardenas, agents arrested defendant in connection with an alien smuggling
conspiracy. During an initial interrogation on the evening of May 15, they provided
defendant with her rights per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in Spanish and
English. Cardenas, 410 F.3d at 290. Defendant waived her rights and answered
questions. See id. at 290; see also id at 291, 292, 295.
The next morning, agents discussed the May 15 interrogation among themselves
and determined it was not entirely accurate. Id. at 290-91. They asked defendant
"whether she wished to speak to [Attorney] Martinez, and urged her to cooperate, telling
her they believed her previous statement was untruthful. [Defendant] then indicated she
wished to speak to Martinez. Handcuffed, she was brought from the detention area to a
conference room in the U.S. Attorney's office." Id at 291. Agents again administered
Miranda warnings and defendant again waived. Id.
Prior to trial, defendant maintained that the waiver for May 16 was coerced in part
because she was handcuffed. See id, at 291-92. The trial court agreed. See id. at 292.
The government appealed, and the appellate court reversed. It stated that "[w]e have
8

never held that a new recitation of rights is required with every break in interrogation."
Id. at 294. Thus, the warnings and waiver on May 16 likely were unnecessary. Also, the
court ruled that the total circumstances surrounding the waiver, including the fact that the
defendant was handcuffed, would not support coercion. Id at 295; see also Whitaker,
135 P.3d at 930-31 (rejecting defendant's claim that he was coerced into waiving his
Miranda rights based on the fact that he was a "young man" in a Los Angeles sheriffs
bureau being interrogated by FBI veterans, and he was "handcuffed").
Montero's argument does not hinge on the handcuffs during that point in time
when Adamson provided Miranda warnings; rather, his argument concerns the coercive
nature of the total circumstances in the interrogation. (See Br. of Appellant, Argument).
Thus, Cardenas and Whitaker, are inapplicable.
In addition, while the court in Agnello, 674 N.W.2d at 600, stated that case law
may not support that "handcuffing in itself is coercive, it also recognized that "Agnello
was not handcuffed during the interrogation sessions." Id He was handcuffed "only
during breaks when the officers left the room." Id That case is distinguishable since
Montero was handcuffed to a chair during the entirety of the six-plus-hour detention for
interrogation. (See R. 487:207; 488:299; 524 (videos)); see also State v. Knight, 518
So.2d 799, 800 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (considering that the "essentially illiterate"
defendant was handcuffed to a chair for almost six hours). That fact contributes to the
overall coercive nature of the environment.
In deciding coercion, a court will consider whether the confession was the product
of improper or coercive pressures or techniques used by the police. It will consider
9

whether the defendant was the "victim of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which
the pressures brought to bear on [him] ... exceeded the defendant's ability to resist." State
v. Clappes, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987). Police conduct does not need to be egregious
in order to be coercive; subtle pressures are coercive where they exceed a defendant's
ability to resist. See State v. Hoppe, 661 N.W.2d 407, 416 (Wis. 2003). This Court will
decide the matter based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation
and confession.
The detective's persistence in connection with numerous other tactics used
throughout the interrogation support that Montero confessed to end the matter. (Br. of
Appellant, 15-34 (reflecting total circumstances of the interrogation); id at 35-46
(pointing to techniques used throughout the interrogation)). As further described in the
Brief of Appellant, Adamson used manipulation designed to induce the accused to
confess where the accused otherwise would not have confessed. (Br. of Appellant,
Argument). The total facts and circumstances support coercion.
B. MONTERO WAS PREJUDICED.
With respect to prejudice, the state relies on a form of the sufficiency analysis and
identifies evidence it considers relevant to the jury's verdict. (See Br. of Appellee, 46
(identifying evidence to support a verdict)). That analysis is inapplicable here. See State
v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (in assessing prejudice, the court will not
apply the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by
the error").
In addition, the state assumes the jury was unaffected by the confession and the
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jury found Marci Batchelor and Eugene Spight to be credible and compelling. (See Br.
of Appellee, 46 (citing to evidence from Marci Batchelor and Eugene Spight, and
evidence of flight to support a lack of prejudice)). The state's analysis disregards that
evidence of a confession has a profound influence on the jury. See Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). Confession evidence can lead the jury to make
credibility findings where it otherwise would not. See, e.g., id. at 298.
[A] full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of
the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its
decision. In the case of a coerced confession such as that given by [defendant]
Fulminante to [the government informant], the risk that the confession is
unreliable, coupled with the profound impact that the confession has upon the jury,
requires a reviewing court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the
admission of the confession at trial was harmless.
Id at 296.
Also, in this case the state disregards that Marci expressed "doubt" about her
reported observations. (See R. 487:96-97). Likewise, evidence supports that Eugene's
perceptions were inexact, fallible and influenced by his emotional and inebriated state.
(See R. 488:304-05, 307, 308, 311); see also State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n. 1
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing the law, where there may be reasons for flight that are
consistent with innocence, and evidence of flight does not necessarily reflect guilt); State
v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575-76 (Utah 1983) (stating that "the idea that flight constitutes
an 'implied admission' of guilt is not supported by any federal or state decision"). Thus,
the evidence - absent the coerced confession - raised doubt about guilt. (See R. 487:9697 (Marci testified to doubt); 488:304-05, 307, 308, 311 (evidence supported that Eugene
was drunk, shocked, and confused; also he identified a person named Pierre Brandon and
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indicated the shooter got in the front passenger seat of a Jeep)).
In addition, the evidence pointed to Johnson as the shooter. (Br. of Appellant, 49).
Based on the record here, it is likely that the confession had a persuasive influence
on the trial and the jury. See, e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296. That constitutes
prejudice.
The state has failed in its burden of proof in demonstrating a lack of prejudice.
See id. at 295-96 (specifying the state must meet its burden in "demonstrating that the
admission of the confession" did not contribute to the defendant's conviction); State v.
Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986) (articulating "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 359, 377 (Utah 1993) (stating "the side
which benefited by the error (the prosecution) must show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error did not contribute to the verdict (or sentence) obtained"). The inadmissible evidence harmed Montero, compelling the determination that this case should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant and above, Montero respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the trial court ruling on the motion to exclude the interrogation
statements and remand the case for further proceedings.
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